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Abstract: Focusing on the region surrounding the Maroni River, which 
forms the border between Suriname and French Guiana, we examine 
how relations between different state and non-state social groups are 
articulated in terms of security. The region is characterised by multiple 
“borders” and frontiers of various kinds, the state boundary having the 
features of an interface or contact zone. Several key collectivities meet 
in this border zone: native Amazonians, tribal Maroon peoples, migrant 
Brazilian gold prospectors, and metropolitan French state functionaries. 
We explore the relationships between these different sets of actors and 
describe how their mutual encounters center on discourses of human and 
state security, thus challenging the commonly held view of the region as 
a stateless zone and showing that the “human security” of citizens from 
the perspective of the state may compete with locally salient ideas or ex-
periences of well-being.
Keywords: border, French Guiana, gold mining, healthcare, human secu-
rity, indigenous and tribal peoples, securitization, Suriname
Introduction
The Maroni River marks the boundary between Suriname, to the west, and 
French Guiana, to the east. From its dark headwaters broken by treach-
erous rapids, to the wide stretch of muddy water that sedately flows be-
tween Albina and St. Laurent, the small towns near its mouth, it forms 
a peculiar international border in South America. French Guiana has 
the full status of a French overseas département, and Suriname, formally 
known as Dutch Guiana, obtained independence from the Netherlands 
in 1975. The Maroni therefore constitutes a border between a develop-
ing, postcolonial nation, and one of the European Union’s nine Ultra- 
Peripheral Regions (Grenier, 2011, p. 17). Because of its rich and complex 
history and its extraordinary natural environment, this river is a thriv-
ing example of the border as “interface” rather than “margin” (Boudoux 
d’Hautefeuille, 2012), a place of intense movement and interaction. The 
18 Regions & Cohesion ? Winter 2014
river itself constitutes the main vector of movement along the border, even 
more than across it. Most importantly, as a social space, it is a “contact 
zone,” fragmented with multiple environmental, social, and ontological 
borders, visible and invisible, where distinct collectivities “meet, clash, and 
grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations 
of power” (Pratt 1991, p. 34).1 It is useful to analyze these relations in terms 
of security, and specifically human security, because it helps to achieve 
critical clarity on central anthropological issues of social cohesion, agency, 
and power (Eriksen, 2010). In our analysis we will consider the effects of 
“security discourses” (Pedersen and Holbraad, 2013, p. 9), which some-
times have a tangential relationship to the agency of the state. These are 
discourses that appeal to uncertainty about the future and refer to threats, 
dangers, or fears (Pedersen and Holbraad, 2013, p. 2). They may enlist or 
implicitly refer to the idea of security familiar from international relations, 
but we are primarily interested in their local expressions, modalities, and 
effects. Our purpose is to study how encounters between radically different 
others are represented in terms of security: without necessarily sustaining 
an anthropological concept of security, we explore anthropologically the 
effects of discourses and ideas of security as used by different social actors.2
State and securitization in a contact zone
Despite the river’s role as a regional hub of economic and cultural activity, 
and despite its arguably strategic position as a gateway to France and Eu-
rope, the state appears to be strangely absent on either side: border controls 
are minimal and ignored by most local inhabitants as well as migrants who 
travel from neighboring countries (Brazil, Guyana) and Caribbean islands, 
such as Saint Lucia and Haiti. The relative lack of state infrastructure in the 
Maroni basin has led some authors to describe it as a “government void,” 
where historical conflicts have paradoxically generated the relatively 
“peaceful” cohabitation of distinct ethnic and national communities (Kruijt 
& Hoogbergen, 2005, p. 199). We will argue, however, that behind this su-
perficial absence, the state manifests itself through forms of coercion and 
political institutional control, first and foremost in discourses and practices 
of securitization that focus on specific collectivities, including the region’s 
native tribal and indigenous inhabitants as well as the Brazilian migrants 
mostly involved in gold extraction. The French state in particular asserts its 
presence through the provision of healthcare and military operations. The 
Creole population being unable to furnish enough qualified personnel, the 
state is to a large extent represented by Metropolitan French employees 
who work for the most part on short-term contracts as civil servants in all 
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sectors of the administration, notably as healthcare providers. We argue 
that these non-native collectivities share a detachment from the region and 
a temporality based on the short-term and the projection of a personal and 
social future away from the Maroni. This processual detachment leads to 
the construction of a discourse of securitization that alienates local inhabi-
tants and promotes a state of insecurity, especially at the human level.
The detachment and impermanence of non-native collectivities in the 
region can be dated back to the early days of European New World explo-
ration (Harris, 1928; Hemming, 1995; Hulme & Whitehead, 1992). British, 
French, and Dutch colonizers remained ensconced along the Guianese 
coast where they traded with the Amerindian inhabitants and later, in 
Dutch Guiana, established plantations with slave labor in the seventeenth 
century (Price, 2011; Williamson, 1923). Fugitive African slaves from the 
sugar plantations found refuge in the forests of the Maroni region along-
side the Central Carib and Arawak populations (Price, 2011, p. 10). Here, 
too, the few who escaped the notorious French penal colony at St. Lau-
rent sought the safety of the forest. Over the centuries, relations between 
the new Maroon societies and the colonial powers unfolded through a 
series of wars and treaties,3 while Amerindians nurtured reciprocal ties 
with their tribal and European neighbors, based on cycles of warfare and 
alliances, which are far from forgotten. In peacetime, the Maroni river and 
its tributaries have always been the main thoroughfare, in the absence of 
roads, and the Maroons, especially the Aluku and Saramaka, have con-
tinued to dominate river transportation through their superior skill at 
passing the numerous dangerous rapids, which can be fatal to less expert 
pilots (Jolivet, 2007, p. 94). With this rich history of colonial and inter- 
ethnic wars, the Maroni remains more than a state boundary: in relation to 
the state, it is a peculiar liminal zone populated by independent collectiv-
ities that have challenged colonial and postcolonial authorities.
This zone is characterized by a proliferation of borders. The first of 
these are what might be termed “ethnic” borders: those between local, 
non-state collectivities such as cultural, linguistic, and territorial groups. 
The history of the relationship between Amerindians and Maroons has 
included periods of peace and war, sometimes involving alliances with 
Europeans, starting with the Kali’na’s role in Dutch expeditions to cap-
ture runaway slaves. Their most recent territorial conflict ended in the late 
nineteenth century with a peace treaty, sealed by the mutual consumption 
of the blood of the chiefs of the warring parties, which established precise 
territorial limits.4 These are generally respected, although they remain in-
visible to outsiders, and they are protected with life-threatening curses, 
which may be interpreted as placeholders for an implicit threat of vio-
lence. The most recent fighting between Maroons and Amerindians took 
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place through their involvement on opposite sides in the Surinamese civil 
war in the 1980s (Dupuy, 2008, p. 190–195; Jolivet, 2005, p. 105). However, 
relations between these two collectivities are rapidly worsening due to the 
environmental and social pressures brought by the current gold rush on 
their ancestral land.
This gold rush has created an environmental frontier, another kind 
of border now pervading the Maroni basin. Since the early 1990s, thou-
sands of Brazilian migrants, mostly from the northern states of Pará and 
Maranhão, have entered Suriname and French Guiana to work alongside 
smaller numbers of Maroons and Amerindians, cutting forest and scouring 
creeks and river beds for gold (Simonian & Da Silva Ferreira, 2006; Theije, 
2006; Theije & Bal, 2010). This frontier, we suggest, exists for certain social 
groups and not for others: life in the forest is perceived by Europeans and 
Brazilians as an antagonistic struggle against the forces of nature, mani-
fested through illness such as malaria and through other natural dangers 
such as snakebites, but for the native Amerindians and Maroons, the sharp 
distinction between nature and culture, taken for granted by Euro-Amer-
ican cosmologies, has little meaning (Descola, 2005). For them, something 
that might be termed an ontological border plays a more important role in 
daily life. The categories, expectations and norms that are taken for granted 
by one set of actors are not necessarily shared by others, and while this 
may be a feature common to other cosmopolitan settings or contact zones, 
it is particularly acute in a region in which quite radically different social 
groups live alongside each other, and where it is accompanied by some 
stark power differentials. On the Maroni, Amerindians and Maroons come 
to encounter the Metropolitan French who run the state-provided services 
on the French bank of the river. These last, including teachers, nurses, and 
state functionaries such as customs officials and even gendarmes, tend to 
work for one-off tours of duty, lasting three months, for which they are 
paid often several times the usual rate to compensate for what is perceived 
to be the parochial nature of their posting. It is in these encounters that, 
we argue, socialities of securitization are produced—that is to say, sets of 
social relations that are based on, and experienced in terms of, the friction 
(Tsing, 2005) between different parties’ perceptions of security; socialities 
that are thus based on “working misunderstandings” or equivocal compat-
ibilities (Piña Cabral, 1999; Sahlins, 1979).
War, slavery, and human (in)security on the Maroni
The Maroni basin has been marked by concerns for human security since 
at least the late seventeenth century. The first Maroons were from the first 
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generation of slaves to be brought from Sub-Saharan Africa, and so had 
themselves been victims of forced migration (Price, 2011). Their escape 
from the brutal certitudes of slavery was a flight into the unknown, but the 
forest provided security from oppression and secure possession of their 
persons (to evoke Locke).
Indeed, at first sight, the freedom of the Maroons may be taken to 
exemplify the free individual at the heart of liberal theory, from which 
the concept of human security emerges (Eriksen, 2010; Pedersen and 
Holbraad, 2013). However, the societies they formed are far from indi-
vidualistic, and Maroon people distinguish themselves from the bakaa, a 
category that broadly refers to “white people, and those who share their 
individualized way of life,” that is, the other principally urban ethnici-
ties of the region, such as Creoles, “Hindustanis,” “Javanese,” etc. (Jolivet, 
2008, p. 93). One Ndjuka leader told us that he dislikes the term Maroon 
and prefers “Africans”—emphasizing even further his people’s difference 
from the descendants of freed slaves known as Creoles.5 In this vein, the 
Maroni appears from a Maroon perspective as a place of refuge from state 
violence; contrary to Hobbes, the state, whose apparatus is dominated by 
bakaa, appears to pose a threat to human security and, indeed the collec-
tive security of Maroon clans (lo) and tribes, these themselves being the 
prime guarantors of the security of individual persons.
This view is underlined by the more recent history of the civil war 
of the 1980s in Suriname. After the rise to power of Desi Bouterse in 1982 
following the 1980 military coup, relations with the interior “temporar-
ily improved” as welfare provisions were ameliorated and development 
policies for the interior were seriously discussed (Kruijt & Hoogbergen, 
2005, p. 203). Administrative obstacles to Maroon participation in public 
life were removed, and one Ndjuka from the bauxite mining region of 
Cottica, Ronnie Brunswijk, quickly rose through the ranks of the army 
to become a member of Bouterse’s private security guard. From 1984, a 
personal conflict between the two men spiraled into an armed confron-
tation between Bouterse’s army and Brunswijk’s own militia, the Jungle 
Commando (Jolivet, 2007, p. 95, 2008, pp. 92–93), which opposed Creoles 
and Maroons in a civil war that lasted until 1992. Brunswijk led guerrilla 
attacks against the state, taking effective control of eastern Suriname and 
raising funds through drug trafficking. Bouterse retaliated with “coun-
terinsurgency operations”: “Villages and settlements were plundered, 
burned down and flattened with bulldozers” (Kruijt & Hoogbergen, 2005, 
p. 203), and the army bombed the island of Langatabbetje. As the fighting 
escalated, nearly 10,000 people (c. 8,500 Maroons and 1,500 Amerindians) 
fled to French Guiana. France registered them in 1991, giving them identity 
cards to allow them to circulate freely within a restricted part of the dépar-
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tement (Kruijt & Hoogbergen, 2005, p. 203), but without granting them the 
status of refugees (French 1991). They were allowed to stay in makeshift 
camps, where the St. Laurent population perceived them as a nuisance, 
and at the end of the war the French military destroyed the camps, despite 
the continuing state of insecurity in many of the refugees’ home villages in 
Suriname. Indeed, for this reason, many Ndjuka and Saramaka refugees 
refused the funds offered by the French state to encourage their return 
home (Jolivet, 2007, p. 95). Today, eastern Suriname is relatively peace-
ful, but a large number of Surinamese Maroons have remained in French 
Guiana, only some of whom have been granted French citizenship. The 
Surinamese state never resumed the initiatives for integration and devel-
opment that were emerging in the early 1980s, although there have been 
sporadic interventions, as we shall see. The principal motor of develop-
ment and change has instead been the informal economy, most notably 
that surrounding the gold rush that took root even as the civil war was 
drawing to a close at the beginning of the 1990s.
Gold and insecure sociality
Under economic pressure at home, thousands of poor migrants from 
northern Brazil flocked to Suriname from the 1990s onward to claim part 
of the riches that lay hidden under the forest and waterways of the Ma-
roni region. These gold miners, known as garimpeiros (“prospectors” in 
Portuguese), choose to yield the benefits of what Eriksen calls “insecure 
sociality”: their lives are dominated by hazards, risks to safety, and they 
have few sources of “security” of any kind: in the absence of physical se-
curity they have little access to healthcare, and their material security fluc-
tuates radically from wealth to penury (2010, p. 11). The perpetual threat 
of violence is such that they must rely on little more than the weapons 
they carry for the security of their person (Kruijt & Hoogbergen, 2005), 
for they do not benefit from the strong group solidarity that characterizes 
the kinship-based societies of the Maroons and Amerindians (Theije & 
Bal, 2010). Yet, the garimpeiros may experience this short-term insecurity 
in their everyday lives as a form of freedom of agency, and as the price 
to pay for an imagined future time of financial security, when they will 
have the gold, or the money, to set up their own small businesses at home 
in Brazil; indeed some garimpeiros send money home to their families for 
this purpose (Theije & Bal, 2010). As Pedersen and Holbraad have argued 
(2013), security has a particular relationship with time, and any idea of 
security is based upon imagined future scenarios. (In)security thus de-
pends upon historically, socially, and culturally defined temporalities. 
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In this case, (in)security is also divided between places, as the risks that 
garimpeiros live with in the present on the Maroni are the price to pay for 
a stable family home in Brazil as well as a secure future for themselves 
when they return.
It is not only Brazilians who mine for gold. Many Maroons and Amer-
indians are also involved in a number of ways, and during our own field 
research among the Trio of the upper Tapanahoni, a major tributary of the 
Maroni, and among the Wayana of the Litani (the headwaters of the Ma-
roni itself), we met several men who had worked as miners. These young 
men exposed themselves to the considerable dangers of this work, despite 
having opportunities that their Brazilian counterparts lacked. They al-
ready had the possibility of cutting swidden fields and building houses in 
their home villages or those of their wives, and some of them had indeed 
returned for the end of the dry season to cut and burn new swiddens and 
enjoy the seasonal dancing and feasting. Seeking gold merely gave them 
the chance to gain additional cash wealth, which they used to purchase 
small luxuries such as jewelry and electrical goods. Most of their earnings, 
however, were spent on transportation – in the absence of roads, travel 
to Amerindian villages is expensive, whether by air or by river, because 
of the fuel required. These men were as proud of their ability to speak 
Portuguese and of the words, including Portuguese nicknames, that they 
had tattooed on their bodies in the gold mining centers, as they were of 
any gold they had found or money they had made. When they returned to 
their villages for annual festivities they did so with the swagger of myth-
ical heroes who had traveled to distant lands to fight monsters. Among 
the Trio and Wayana, as among other Amerindian peoples of lowland 
South America, personhood and indeed social identity and cohesion are 
paradoxically dependent on an engagement with alterity, which involves 
its consumption and appropriation into native symbolic structures. Older 
Trio and Wayana men who have worked as gold miners in the past rarely 
live differently from their contemporaries, but their scars, tattoos, and sto-
ries stand as evidence of their past exploits. Eriksen compares the sociality 
of insecurity with Ibsen’s Peer Gynt, whose adventures brought him inter-
mittent wealth and experience, but whose personality was like an onion: 
peeling away the layers of experience, he found no core (2010, p. 9). But 
Amerindian personhood, if it is constructed through youthful and heroic 
encounters with alterity, later solidifies into something more substantial 
through the daily round of commensality, compounding affective and 
consanguineal ties of kinship (Grotti, 2013, pp. 24–25).
However, if kinship and the routines of subsistence and daily and sea-
sonal ritual provide a source of human security, these things are threat-
ened even in remote villages by the encroaching presence of gold mining 
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and the insecure sociality that surrounds it. Individualistic violence is 
intensified by cocaine and other drugs. Prostitution, although mostly in-
volving the Brazilian women who are far less numerous than their male 
counterparts (Antonius-Smits, Altenberg, Binrleson, & Taitt-Codrington, 
1999; Kruijt & Hoogbergen, 2005, p. 206), also sometimes involves Am-
erindian women, leading to fears of sexually transmitted diseases.6 Envi-
ronmental pollution is an increasing threat, especially through mercury 
poisoning: mercury becomes especially concentrated in the large carniv-
orous fish that the Wayana favor in their diet, and has potentially serious 
consequences for unborn children (Charlet & Boudou, 2005, p. 73).
Risk and securitization in healthcare encounters
According to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, human 
health is one of the key domains from which the multi-dimensional anal-
ysis provided by a human security approach can benefit. From the or-
ganization’s perspective, this means that addressing the environmental, 
economic, and social components of ill-health contributes to human se-
curity; the examples of obstacles to achieving good health come under 
generic goals, such as the improvement of health-care systems, the ed-
ucation of the public, or the development of local-level health insurance 
schemes that reach the most vulnerable people (UNOCHA, n.d.). In this 
light, the Maroni basin represents a challenge in itself to such consensual 
objectives: this border area is located at the interface between two national 
healthcare systems that do not have a poor health record in general terms; 
indeed, Suriname’s healthcare compares reasonably favorably to other 
South American countries, and France has one of the best healthcare sys-
tems and health indicators in the world (PAHO/WHO 2012). Moreover, in 
French Guiana, since 2000, when a Universal Health Insurance (Couverture 
Médicale Universelle) was introduced, non-nationals, whether legally pres-
ent on the territory or not (known as sans-papiers) can claim access to med-
ical care and have their medical expenses reimbursed (Carde, 2012, p. 3).
France was nevertheless reprimanded recently by a UN human rights 
body about a “discriminatory political discourse” associated with “the in-
creasing difficulties faced by certain inhabitants of [French] overseas terri-
tories in accessing health care without discrimination” (UNHCHR, 2010; 
Jolivet, Lebas, & Chauvin, 2010, p. 1827). In a context of apparent gen-
eral prosperity, healthcare provision in the Maroni basin (like the rest of 
French Guiana) is underperforming. Most services are concentrated in the 
hospital of St. Laurent, and the Maroon and Amerindian populations (not 
to mention garimpeiros) do not therefore have easy access to them. This 
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is not only due to the legacy of the civil war that has left the Surinamese 
bank with little infrastructure, but also because of human and structural 
problems on the French side of the river (Jolivet et al., 2011; Weisberg, 
2013).
Access to healthcare is also subject to bureaucratic obstacles, and at-
tempts to address these have created further problems. The introduction 
of a universal healthcare plan has made healthcare providers living in 
French Guiana (who are either Creoles or Metropolitan French) feel re-
sponsible for controlling what they perceive to be an increasing influx of 
undocumented healthcare and welfare claimants. Local tribal and indig-
enous patients who live on either side of the Maroni often lack identity 
papers and entitlements to French social security, and this applies to more 
recent migrants to the region such as Surinamese or Brazilian nationals. 
As Carde suggests, healthcare professionals start to become discretionary 
regulators of immigration in their daily encounters with undocumented 
claimants (2012, p. 5).
The Maroni basin, with its history of conflict and migrations, has be-
come a place where medical encounters are marked by the tension be-
tween caring and controlling. It can be argued that delivering health on 
this frontier zone becomes less about promoting individual human secu-
rity than attempting to securitize a social space perceived as being in con-
stant flux, and which the healthcare practitioners struggle to understand 
and identify with (Carde, 2010, 2012). Although previous studies have 
demonstrated that migration in the region is not driven by health-related 
motivations but rather by economic ones (Jolivet et al., 2011), healthcare 
professionals in French Guiana clearly seem to perceive the patients they 
deal with as radical others whose behavior is unpredictable and irratio-
nal: they consequently do not trust them to take their medicine or report 
changes in their condition. Their encounters, in theory marked by the sole 
concern of human security, tend in fact to be characterized by a lack of 
mutual understanding, which leads to an overuse of languages of securiti-
zation among the biomedical healthcare personnel. This takes place most 
notably in the field of maternal health: indigenous and tribal expectant 
mothers are pressurized to come to the hospital, often months before they 
are due to give birth, through deliberately emotive warnings that staying 
in their villages puts them and their babies at risk. As one healthcare prac-
titioner in St. Laurent told us, antenatal care visits are just about one thing: 
scaring the woman patient so much about the potential risks to her child 
and the possibility of death that she feels compelled to travel all the way to 
the hospital to give birth. Many women, faced with the prospect of being 
separated from their families, often for many weeks, choose not to travel 
to the hospital, or wait until the last moment, when it may be too late.
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In French Guiana, as in the rest of France, there are no traditional birth 
attendants, no non-governmental clinics or dispensaries, no locally trained 
midwives or physicians. There are only private-practice and state-employed 
midwives and physicians, all trained in Metropolitan France (Weisberg, 
2013, 26). All births are hospital-based, and in the case of the populations 
of the Maroni, are expected to take place either at the maternity ward of the 
Centre Hospitalier de l’Ouest Guyanais in St. Laurent du Maroni (lower 
Maroni inhabitants), or in the maternity ward of the Centre Hospitalier 
Andrée Rosemon in Cayenne (upper Maroni inhabitants). There are also 
two smaller privately-run maternity wards in Cayenne and Kourou. Since 
2006, the regional health authorities have made it explicitly forbidden for 
women to give birth informally in the health centers (Centre de Santé) on 
the French bank on the Maroni river, especially in the largest post on the 
river located in Maripasoula. On the Surinamese bank, although women 
patients residing in the interior can give birth in the health posts of the 
Medical Mission Suriname or indeed at home, there has been a drop in 
recorded births in the past 10 years.
The French hospital in St. Laurent, which has one of the two free, state-
funded maternity wards of the département, ostensibly provides a form of 
security against the threats posed to human health by disease and pollu-
tion but also by potential complications in biological processes, particularly 
pregnancy and childbirth. The very high rate of childbirth in this region 
makes this especially significant. Risks to health are perceived differently 
by medical professionals and patients in most contexts. Medical staff, often 
in place for too short a period to become familiar with local people, fre-
quently focus on what they perceive as “risky” behavior on the part of 
patients, casting responsibility on them for any potential health problems 
that may arise while they are out of the direct control of the hospital. Re-
lations between medical staff and patients are also caught up in anxieties 
and perceptions of questions of citizenship, as the former tend to assume 
that expectant mothers who wish to give birth on French soil do so in a bid 
to obtain French citizenship for their children, and thus to obtain for them 
the privileges of social security and better opportunities for employment.
Medical staff express fears of losing control over patients unaccus-
tomed to the rigors of medical bureaucracy, and fears of exploitation of 
the system on the part of patients (Weisberg, 2003). This leads them to 
produce a discourse of securitization: their claims that the patients’ health 
and the integrity of the state are felt to be at risk lead them to treat patients 
in an alienating manner, making patients less willing to place themselves 
in the hands of medical staff. Garimpeiros, for example, consequently turn 
to Surinamese health providers when they need healthcare. In a surpris-
ing reversal of the fears of French metropolitans and Creoles, Surinamese 
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health officials blame the French authorities for what they perceive as mi-
gration towards Suriname to access healthcare there.
State security vs. human security
The role of the state in the provision of healthcare and the equivocations 
discussed above raise questions about the relationship between state in-
terventions and human security. A more extreme, though less quotidian, 
example of state intervention in the Maroni region is that of the military 
operations that take place intermittently to remove unlawful mining op-
erations. Many such operations have taken place in French Guiana since 
2002, under a succession of codenames (such as Anaconda, Toucan, or 
Harpie) that reflect an escalating securitization discourse on the part of the 
departmental authorities. When French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited 
French Guiana in 2010, he declared that Operation Harpie should remain 
“permanent and perennial”. Although controlling gold mining is primar-
ily a matter for the police, the different administrative sectors, including 
the army, gendarmerie, police, customs, judiciary and several others, must 
coordinate to enforce a series of security objectives.7 In the same docu-
ment, a report for the French Senate, the authors also note that, because of 
the “porosity” of the borders and because they share the same problems, 
neighboring states (i.e., Brazil and Suriname) need to be involved (Rohan, 
Dupont, Berthou, & Antoinette, 2011).
While the nature and extent of this international cooperation are 
difficult to ascertain, a comparison of the French security operations of 
2011 and 2012 can give an idea of their intensity, and the tone of the press 
reports suggests a public discourse of securitization beyond that of the 
state administration itself. While the government defense website head-
line reads “No end of year truce for Operation Harpie” (Ministère de la 
Défense, 2013), the newspaper France Guyane reports:
The numbers speak for themselves: 8.1kg of gold seized last year compared 
to 11.7 in 2011. Nobody can claim these are good results. The same for the 
seizures of mercury (76kg compared to 135kg in 2011), firearms, etc. …
 The reality is that the press release presented to journalists yesterday 
morning at the Préfecture was pretty thin. … The number of operations? 
Reduced. It went down from 4,483 in 2011 to 3,789 last year. “In 2012, 
there were fewer missions than in 2011. The hunt for Manoelzinho is 
the explanation,” underlined the Prefect Denis Labbé. Colonel Didier 
Laumont added that these missions to find the killer of French soldiers 
had made it possible to “asphyxiate the sites. We blocked the entire phe-
nomenon during the whole Manoelzinho period. But we abandoned the 
coastal strip (in personnel).” Why was the hold not maintained then? 
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“We couldn’t maintain this pressure without risking seeing criminality 
increase on the coast.” (Roselé, 2013, our translation)
The usual number of personnel involved in Operation Harpie is 350 
to 400, and it seems that these carry out, on average, over ten operations a 
day. This report shows that, during the hunt for the garimpeiro Manoelzinho, 
who had killed French soldiers, the number of Harpie operations decreased 
slightly, as did the amount of gold seized, but according to this report, the 
increase in personnel, brought in from the coast, allowed a tight enough 
grip on the region for gold mining operations to be eliminated entirely.
No doubt the Operation Harpie and the hunt for Manoelzinho appear 
very differently from the point of view of other actors. But in this light 
it is difficult to view the Maroni region, at least on the French bank, as a 
“state void,” as Kruijt and Hoogbergen call it (2005). While their argument 
is avowedly based primarily on Surinamese data, recent events appear to 
suggest that its validity may be becoming limited even for the Surinam-
ese side of the river. In August 2008, Suriname launched Operation Clean 
Sweep. “Eighty police men and military were launched into Benzdorp 
[the most important gold mining centre, populated mainly by Brazilians] 
with the goal to ‘order the interior’ by ‘bringing an end to all illegal activi-
ties…such as weapons, drugs and gold digging’” (Theije and Heemskerk, 
2010, p. 361). An Aluku spokesman told the press that the Aluku gold 
miners were “shocked by the fact that local communities were not con-
sulted about the operation beforehand” (Theije and Heemskerk, 2010, p. 
361). Suriname thus seems to have begun to emulate the French approach 
to security in the Maroni basin, although the strategy here seems to be 
more one of intimidation rather than of attempting to make gold mining 
economically non-viable, as Anaconda was originally conceived to do. 
Moreover, there has been a simultaneous militarization of healthcare on 
the gold mining frontier in Suriname,8 which has been highly effective in 
reducing malaria; one consequence of this, however, is that a “natural” 
deterrent to gold mining has been removed, and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that it is leading to a further influx of garimpeiros.
De Theije and Heemskerk describe how the French gendarmerie se-
cured and destroyed a gold mining raft in 2007 on the Litani River, a 
tributary of the Maroni in the disputed boundary zone between French 
Guiana and Suriname. This raft was the property of the Wayana village of 
Kawemhakan. They contrast the perception of the incident in French Gui-
ana, where it was “merely seen in the context of a regulatory policy,” and 
in Suriname, where it was “perceived as the destruction of the traditional 
form of livelihood of innocent native peoples,” as well as an illegal French 
action on what is considered Surinamese territory (2010, p. 353), although 
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they do not specify precisely which actors perceived things in this way. The 
authors rightly show that “indigenous and tribal peoples are not passively 
suffering from the gold rush,” but are “active agents in steering gold min-
ing developments in their homelands” (p. 354). In our own experience, the 
Trio and Wayana village of Tëpu on the upper Maroni had gone through at 
least two periods of acceptance and rejection of mining on its territory, as 
two successive headmen had allowed garimpeiros to work there, in return 
for payment, until they gave in to pressure from villagers to withdraw 
permission and expel the miners. Theije and Heemskerk identify a general 
shift in Wayana opinion, from a toleration of moderate mining activity on 
their territory in return for a share of the profit, to a rejection of mining as 
the gold rush intensified and more and more garimpeiros invade Wayana 
land, and the environmental and social problems begin to increase. This 
may not represent a simple, general shift. As these authors note, “differ-
ent Wayana have different interests” (p. 354), some being in favor of gold 
mining and others rejecting it. But it seems that these different interests 
follow a pattern: in the case of Tëpu, the changes in attitude to gold mining 
hinged on the power relations between the chief and the people, as the 
payments were not evenly distributed and only a few Trio profited from 
the arrangement, whereas the presence of miners was associated with the 
introduction of strong alcohol, drugs, and violence, with which ordinary 
villagers grew increasingly dissatisfied.
Land rights and the discourse of global environmental security 
The practice of mining on the Surinamese banks of the Maroni is linked 
in numerous and complex ways to questions of land rights. In technical 
violation of the Surinamese Mining Law, many owners of mining con-
cessions delegate their exploitation to small-scale miners for a fixed fee 
or monthly percentage of production (Theije & Heemskerk, 2010, p. 357). 
The national concession system conflicts with the customary land rights 
of indigenous and tribal peoples, whose leaders claim the right to control 
and profit over mining on their territory. Despite the Mineral Ordinance 
of 1932 (Kambel & MacKay, 1999) and the Forestry Law of 1992 stipu-
lating that customary rights of tribal communities should be taken into 
account, it provides no “measures for the protection of these rights,” and 
does not “define procedures for consultation, compensation and appeal” 
(Theije & Heemskerk, 2010, p. 357). In an overview of the legal framework 
in Suriname regarding the exploitation of natural resources, Kambel and 
MacKay conclude that there is no mechanism to incorporate indigenous 
and Maroon participation in decision making about resource exploita-
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tion, the country remains “without any form of environmental legisla-
tion, framework or otherwise,” and there is inadequate protection in the 
forestry and mining laws (Kambel & MacKay, 1999, p. 116). Meanwhile, 
according to law, French territory is “indivisible,” meaning that “tribal 
peoples cannot obtain rights to a part of the territories based on ethnic-
ity” (Theije & Heemskerk, 2010, p. 357; cf. Martres and Larrieu, 1993), but 
in practice the state grants right of use to specific groups, although these 
are not officially based on ethnicity. In the Parc Amazonien de Guyane, 
created in 2007, which covers most of the southern part of French Guiana, 
there are precise rules designating areas for traditional use, including 
areas of right of use, as well as zones of libre adhésion (free adhesion) in 
which traditional activities such as hunting and collecting forest products 
are permitted, representing 1.4 million hectares of the park’s total area of 
3.4 million hectares (Parc, 2013).
There are numerous factors affecting the acceptance or rejection of 
gold mining on Amerindian territory. Certain village leaders can effec-
tively accept or reject mining on their territory because of the lower level 
of pressure from miners and the strength of their perceived capacity to 
enforce their rejection of them. But elsewhere, where mining is more in-
tense, leadership is more strongly contested and villages are smaller, vil-
lage leaders have greater difficulty in exercising control and demanding 
substantial rents or shares of profit, because the state does not promise 
to act to enforce customary land rights. And, in other cases, particularly 
in Ndjuka territory, the Surinamese government itself infringes custom-
ary land rights by granting concessions to small entrepreneurs and large 
mining corporations. In contrast to Maroons and Amerindians, garimpeiros 
have no basis for claiming land rights, but they compensate for this with a 
flexible attitude, and unlike some Maroons, they do not worry about what 
will happen when the gold runs out (Theije & Bal, 2010).
If concern over the destructive effects of gold mining provided part 
of the impetus for the creation of the Parc Amazonien de Guyane, simi-
lar concerns, combined with the threat to livelihoods posed by the state’s 
granting of concessions to international corporations, led in recent years 
to the increasingly effective mobilization of Maroon peoples in defense of 
their customary rights. This began when some 6,000 Saramaka and Ndjuka 
were displaced from their land in from 1963 to 1964 to make way for a 
hydroelectric dam and reservoir in Brokopondo. As Kambel and MacKay 
write, “they were paid the equivalent of US3$ in compensation and were 
not provided with secure land rights in their new areas” (1999, p. 105). 
Spurred by the state supported invasion of their lands by Chinese loggers in 
the 1990s, the Saramaka people finally took the case to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which ruled in their favor:
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[It ordered the] delimitation, demarcation, and granting of collective title 
over the territory of the Saramaka people; the granting to the Saramaka 
people legal recognition as having a collective juridical capacity [a legal 
personality]; removing or amending the legal provisions that impede 
protection of the Saramakas’ collective property; adopting legislative, 
administrative, and other measures to ensure the right of the Saramaka 
people to be effectively consulted, and to give or withhold their free, in-
formed, and prior consent with regard to development projects that may 
affect their territory. (Price, 2012)
Although Suriname has complied with none of the court orders, 
the ruling did lead the government to hold a conference on gold mining 
with the Maroons, in March 2011. On this occasion, the Maroon groups 
announced that they would tolerate no more concessions on their lands 
until the government recognized their land rights. This brought them into 
line with the Surinamese Amerindian organizations, and the government 
promised a conference with both indigenous and tribal peoples on land 
rights in June of the same year. At the same time, the government had 
decided to fall into step with the growing current in international de-
velopment and conservation to merge these interests through a focus on 
“natural capital,” and to seek development funding through REDD+, an 
emerging UN program of forest governance to fund forest conservation 
based on the economic value of emissions reductions (Brightman, 2014). 
Informed by the international indigenous peoples’ movement, the indig-
enous and tribal organisations see REDD+ as a potential territorial threat 
through rent seeking: it may provide an incentive to outside parties to 
seek to purchase forests as their value as carbon sinks grows.
The land rights conference of 2011 was abruptly terminated by the 
Surinamese president, who seems to have been offended by the forthright 
tone of the demands of the Amerindian representatives, and the political 
debate continues. The events so far highlight the divergent perspectives of 
the state and the forest peoples, but at the same time, the historic conver-
gence of indigenous and tribal positions. Indeed, as the state attempts to 
close its grip upon the interior, most recently in the name of environmen-
tal security, the common ground between Amerindian and Maroon par-
ties becomes more evident. In relation to both gold mining and forestry, 
land rights have become the focus of bids for collective security among the 
various parties involved.
Conclusion
Rather than using the policy objectives of the “human security approach” 
as it is defined by the United Nations as an analytical framework, we have 
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explored how the idea of “security,” without clear definition, is employed 
in discourses that articulate the relationships between individuals and 
institutions, and between different non-state collectivities or social cate-
gories. We have used the idea of “securitization” to highlight that both 
human security and state security are enlisted in discourses that serve par-
ticular sets of interests. The idea of human security is based on an idea of 
the free individual actor, which has a specific history and emerges from 
liberal political theory. We do not contest its utility as a tool for promoting 
improved well-being, but we do suggest that its application may raise un-
foreseen problems unless one is aware of its limitations.
We have chosen to try to describe the relationships between different 
groups of actors, across multiple fault lines of difference (cultural, linguis-
tic, economic, geographic), in a fragmented zone of multiple borders. This 
is important because it reveals how uncertainty about the future, fear, and 
perceptions of threat or danger, are colored by ontological difference and 
power relations, especially vexed in this postcolonial context on the pe-
ripheries of Europe and the Caribbean and Amazon regions. The univer-
salist idea of security, whether applied to individual persons, small scale 
social groupings or the state, is necessarily and implicitly contested, very 
often by competing interests which can themselves be construed in terms 
of the ‘security’ of other actors. By comparing different perspectives, the 
difficulties of setting out a universal agenda for human security are made 
more visible.
For instance, the human security of citizens from the perspective of 
the state may compete with their human security in terms of locally salient 
ideas or experiences of well-being, and this is illustrated by our analysis of 
state interventions in the name of human health, territorial integrity and 
environmental security. Frictions between such perspectives may further 
contribute to the emergence of socialities of securitization, in which secu-
rity discourses are enlisted to favor particular perspectives over others. 
A security approach carries its own threats and dangers. Security is diffi-
cult to measure; referring necessarily to uncertainty about the future, it is 
open to exploitation by the powerful, and it is for this reason that security 
discourses can be used to suspend the normal rules of conduct for states 
(Agamben, 2005; Schmitt, 2007). Such suspensions of normal rules of con-
duct may take place on a national level to justify acts of war, but they may 
also take place on a micro level, to justify the control of populations (Feld-
man and Ticktin, 2010). An agenda for a human security approach must 
therefore be to explore the ways in which the perspectives, interests, and 
needs of different individual and collective actors differ and, if possible, to 
identify their points of convergence.
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NOTES
 1. For further theoretical discussion of borderlands, see Green 2011, 2013; Wes-
ley Scott 2012; Wilson & Donnan 2012.
 2. This article is based on the analysis of qualitative data collected by the authors 
during several periods of field research from 2003 onward; this included long-
term (21 months) intensive field research in Suriname and French Guiana in 
both remote rural and urban settings. Field sites included villages, health 
centres, hospitals, and governmental and non-governmental headquarters. 
Informants were indigenous peoples (Trio, Wayana, and Akuriyo), Maroons 
(Njuka and Saramaka), government ministers, governmental and non-gov-
ernmental officials, health practitioners, and policy-makers. Methods used 
included participant and non-participant observation, semi-structured inter-
views, and archival research.
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 3. For further information on these treaties, see for instance Collomb & Jolivet, 
2008, and Kambel & MacKay, 1999.
 4. For a detailed discussion of Amerindian-Maroon relationship, see Dupuy, 
2008. For further discussion of histories of identity formation in the region, 
see Aleman and Whitehead, 2009.
 5. Maroons refer to themselves collectively as busikondesama (the people of the 
big forest villages) or, now more commonly, bosinenge (from “bush negro”) 
(Jolivet, 2007, p. 98). For detailed accounts of the formation of tribal societies 
who escaped enslavement and the plantations, see Jolivet, 2007, 2008; Price, 
2011; Thoden van Velzen and Hoogbergen, 2011; van Wetering & Thoden van 
Velzen, 2013.
 6. The rate of HIV infection in the Surinamese interior at the turn of the mille-
nium has been estimated as high as 20% by Price in a critical review of demo-
graphic data on Maroon societies (2002, p. 83). Recent figures are difficult to 
obtain for the interior, but there is a dramatic contrast with the recent PAHO 
estimate, based on 2009 data, of 1.1% for the country as a whole (PAHO 2012).
 7. The report produced for the French Senate’s Commission of foreign affairs 
and defense lists these as follows: 1) to identify, paralyze and dismantle the lo-
gistical flow of supplies (to illegal gold mining operations); 2) To identify the 
individuals involved (traders/organisers, canoe pilots providing transport, 
people smugglers, ‘lookouts’, etc. …); 3) To indict the perpetrators of crimes 
and offences; 4) To conduct foreigners in an irregular situation (ESI) to the 
border; 5) to destroy, following the authorisation of the Public Prosecutor, the 
material used for the extraction of gold or providing logistical supplies to the 
clandestine sites; 6) To restore the sites (Rohan et al., 2011). 
 8. It emerged from some of our interviews that the Surinamese army had taken 
responsibility for establishing malaria treatment centers near gold mining 
camps in the interior.
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Sécurisation, altérité et l’Etat: (in) sécurité humaine  
dans une zone frontalière amazonienne
Marc Brightman et Vanessa Grotti
Résumé : En se concentrant sur la région entourant le fleuve Maroni, qui 
forme la frontière entre le Suriname et la Guyane française, nous exami-
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nons comment les relations entre les différents groupes sociaux étatiques 
et non-étatiques sont articulées en termes de sécurité. La région est ca-
ractérisée par de multiples «frontières» et les frontières de toutes sortes, 
la frontière de l’État ayant les caractéristiques d’une interface ou zone de 
contact. De nombreuses et importantes collectivités se rencontrent dans 
cette zone frontalière: Indigènes d’Amazonie, la communauté tribale Ma-
roon, les migrants brésiliens à la recherche de l’or et les fonctionnaires 
d’Etat de la France métropolitaine. Nous explorons les relations entre 
ces différents groupes d’acteurs, et décrivons la manière dont leurs ren-
contres mutuelles sont centrées sur les discours relatifs à la sécurité hu-
maine et l’État, remettant ainsi en cause l’idée communément admise de 
la région en tant zone apatride et montrant par la même que la «sécurité 
humaine» des citoyens perçue du point de vue de l’État peut rivaliser 
avec des idées saillantes au niveau local ou des expériences relatives au 
bien-être.
Mots-clés: l’altérité, la frontière, la Guyane française, les mines d’or, la 
santé, la sécurité humaine, les peuples indigènes et tribaux, la sécurisa-
tion, le Suriname
La “Seguritización”, la alteridad y el Estado: la (in)seguridad  
humana en una frontera Amazónica
Marc Brightman y Vanessa Grotti
Resumen: El artículo examina cómo se articulan las relaciones en términos 
de seguridad entre grupos estatales y no estatales en la región que rodea 
el Río Maroni (frontera entre la Guyana francesa y Surinam). La región 
se caracteriza por múltiples “límites” y tipos de fronteras, teniendo así 
la frontera Estatal características de una zona de contacto o de una inter-
faz. Importantes comunidades se encuentran en esta zona de frontera: 
Nativos del Amazonas, comunidades tribales del Maroni, buscadores de 
oro brasileños y funcionarios estatales franceses. Los autores exploran las 
relaciones entre estas diferentes redes de actores, y describen la manera 
en que sus mutuos encuentros se centran en discursos de seguridad hu-
mana y del Estado, desafiando así, el tradicional enfoque que sostiene 
la región como una zona sin Estado y mostrando que la “seguridad hu-
mana” desde la perspectiva del Estado puede competir con importantes 
ideas locales o con experiencias de bienestar.
Palabras claves: alteridad, cuidado de la salud, extracción de oro, fron-
tera, indígenas y tribus, seguridad humana, seguritización
